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20 August 1982

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EXPERIENCE IN ORGANIZING MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE DETACHMENTS REPORTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Do Van Khon: "Some Experiences in Organizing Militia and Self-Defense Detachments Specialized in Safeguarding Order and Security in Basic Installations"]

[Text] After 1 year of building and operations, 100 percent of the villages and wards in Thai Binh Province now have militia and self-defense detachments specialized in safeguarding order and security in basic installations. Recently, the military organ of Thai Binh Province held a preliminary conference reviewing good experiences for directing the development and operations in the coming years. These experiences are:

Faced by the Beijing expansionist clique's crafty scheme of waging the many-sided sabotage war against our country, the organization of militia and self-defense units specialized in safeguarding the political security and the social order and safety in basic installations (villages, wards) is very necessary, fits the present demands and duties, and must be a matter of concern for satisfactory development in every aspect.

Regarding [organization], depending on its situation and geography, each village or ward can have between 1 squad and 1 platoon with 15-25 members being appropriate; it is necessary to choose good persons who are responsible, do not fear threats from the enemy and bad elements, and cannot be bribed. These detachments are on the rolls of the mobile militia and self-defense platoon or company of the village or ward. Where [detachment members are involved in] end-product contracts of working groups and individuals, these detachments need to stay close to production organizations, staying in basic production units or specialized units such as vegetation protection units, fish protection units, seed units, etc., so as to synchronize the management of labor in production and the security task, thus they can work for a living and the cooperatives will give them workpoints only whenever they perform their duties day or night. Only in this way can the militia and self-defense organizations carry out their security-national defense duties steadfastly, operate with endurance and enthusiasm, see them and their families have stabilized lives, and combine production with combat and economy with national defense.

Regarding [duties], the detachments unite with the security forces of the village or ward in safeguarding warehouses and properties of the state and collectivities, safeguarding the people's property and lives, safeguarding the party

and political authority, and steadfastly maintaining political security and social order. They struggle against negativism, manage the market, oppose the enemy's psychological warfare and many-sided sabotage war, and stand ready to fight and carry out other unexpected duties.

Regarding [activity program], they have daily command alerts (with platoon and squad cadres taking turns), permanent cells (standing by) to control the general situation and deal with unexpected happenings. The remaining militiamen are to work and produce and to deal with on-site situations. In the evening, they are assigned tasks and activities and action plans such as patrolling, standing watch, controlling, following up, etc. They must be extremely versatile, establish key points, have concrete and detailed plans for when they are dispersed or concentrated, and be assigned tasks based on objectives, spheres or specific time. They must closely coordinate with public security forces and the people's security cells, to motivate large masses to participate, and they must rely on the latter to carry out activities. The units must be under close leadership of party committees and cared for by the political authorities and cooperatives.

Regarding [work systems], daily there are the on duty system, the command alert system and the system of transferring duties from the command authority and the standby cell to the unit in charge of the security guard for the night. Squads hold meetings weekly and platoons monthly to review the responsibility of each cadre and soldier, sum up professional experiences for improvement, and review the implementation of regulations and discipline in the squads and of state laws, the maintenance and use of weapons, etc.

Regarding [equipment], account books are needed to register activities situations of personnel, results of the general activities of the unit, and the strength and weakness of each squad and individual. In localities, where collective activities are held the units have oil lamps, blankets, mats, mosquito nets, and a number of necessary items such as flashlights and raincoats, insuring that the personnel can work in the dark or in the cold rain. Each month citations are issued and evaluation of achievements and awards are made every 6 months.

With the above experiences, the organization, building and activity of the militia and self-defense detachments specialized in safeguarding order and security in basic installations (village, ward) in Thai Binh Province in 1982 will achieve greater results, responding to the demands of their tasks, thus making important contributions to steadfastly safeguarding the political and social order and safety, and to defeating the enemy's many-sided sabotage war.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

EXEMPLARY ENFORCEMENT OF DISCIPLINE BY CADRES CITED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 17 Jun 82 p 3

[Article by Linh Cam: "That Which Was Affirmed at the H88 Group"]

[Excerpt] Firmly stationed at high point Y, the H88 Group has had to undergo a period of very hard struggle before becoming a unit trained in discipline and endowed with a combat strength as it is today. The party committee in the regiment has also drawn lessons and experiences from the task of building the party and youth union and so forth which has also been instrumental in building this unit from the point of view of discipline. People have clearly realized that successive phases of political activity, the youths' forums and the implementation of patterns, regulations and managerial measures have greatly contributed to bringing about favorable changes in discipline enforcement in the unit. But cadres in the H88 Group have unanimously agreed that the exemplary role of the cadres' contingent has proven to be the primary factor with a decisive effect on the problem of discipline.

Speaking out his mind, Th., deputy regimental commander in charge of political affairs in the regiment, said: "To fulfill their mission of holding on fast to high point Y, cadres and combatants must consciously and strictly execute all orders of the higher level with a very high sense of organization and discipline".

The mission is an exacting one while the material living conditions are difficult. In such a situation, to enable combatants to firmly stand on this precarious position, it is first necessary for the cadres to clearly define their political responsibilities and to act in a really exemplary manner from all points of view. In reviewing the process of the group's development over the past more than 3 years, we have clearly seen our role as cadres. There were times when we worked well or not really satisfactorily and when we committed shortcomings. Consequently, all tasks were carried out properly in some battalions and companies while stumbling blocs emerged in others. This actual state of affairs has thus illustrated the cadres' role very clearly.

To fulfill our responsibilities over the past more than 3 years, we the cadres of the H88 Group have undergone many stages of hard study and struggle to improve ourselves and meet the requirements of our mission.

The H88 Group has taken fairly vivid measures to improve cadres and has chosen the right moments and suitable circumstances to promote the advanced training of cadres and to obtain clear-cut results from this task.

After victoriously counterattacking the Chinese aggressors, the unit showed a tendency to wait and see and expressed the wish to go back to the rear to strengthen and build itself. But an order was issued to the group to stay and hold on to the area of high point Y, to continue to stand ready to fight well and to simultaneously try to consolidate and build itself from all points of view. That was a very exacting demand of the mission which required all cadres and combatants in the H88 Group to display a great willpower and a high sense of organization and discipline in order to thoroughly fulfill their duties. Even among certain cadres and party members, there were manifestations of lessened willpower and of a lack of strictness and responsibility in executing orders and tasks. In particular, two company commanders names C. and Q. failed to strictly adhere to combat discipline. The issue was not merely to announce the taking of disciplinary measures against these two comrades but to draw profound lessons on the need for the contingent of cadres to train and improve themselves and to firmly stand on their front line position. The regiment party committee then decided to direct all cadres from the platoon echelon on up to seriously study and discuss this disciplinary case. This was tantamount to an ideological struggle among the cadres which contributed to forming an awareness of the need to execute all orders and tasks and also to tringing about a change in the group which subsequently strove to build a firm battlefield and to stand ready to fight the enemy most effectively.

During the application of the one-commander system, there were times when tasks were carried out in a contradictory manner not only by key commanding cadres in some companies and in battalion 8 but also by commanding cadres at the regiment level. This very unfavorable state of affairs lasted only for a while but somewhat limited the result of the execution of some tasks ordered by the higher level. Clearly aware of this critical problem and thanks to the higher level's support, the regiment party committee hastily directed party committees at various echelons and all cadres throughout the regiment to sternly review this new kind of relationships and to draw lessons on how to achieve the following goal: Really creating a collective strength, solidarity and identity of views necessary for meeting the requirements of the mission--that is, firmly stand on high point Y with readiness to fight well.

Indeed, the abovementioned periods of political activity have helped raise the political qualities and combat spirit of the contingent of cadres, thus enabling them to meet the requirements of their mission.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CADRES' ROLE IN MILITARY DISCIPLINE ENFORCEMENT DISCUSSED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 17 Jun 82 p 3

[Article by Sen Col Nguyen Dang: "Opinion, Emotion and Reason Must Be Meshed Into One"]

[Excerpt] Discipline constitutes the strength of an army. Being the party's armed force whose principal function is to stand ready to fight and to fight victoriously to defend the fatherland, the army must have a really strict discipline under which all orders and directives must be executed quickly and exactly and every cadre and combatant--no matter whatever their positions and circumstances--must satisfactorily carry out the "entire army acts according to orders and regulations" movement. Through the cadres' medium, all party and state lines and policies must be organized and implemented at all echelons down to the combatants' ranks and must be turned into revolutionary acts of the highest effectiveness and quality. Therefore, the cadres' role is important to and has a decisive effect on the materialization of lines, policies, orders and directives and their responsibilities are thus very heavy. The higher the rank of a cadre, the greater his responsibilities. A cadre is first of all a representative of both the higher echelon and his entire unit and is simultaneously responsible to the higher echelon and also to the cadres and combatants in the unit placed in his charge. A skillful and well-disciplined cadre and commander must be evaluated primarily on the basis of an outstanding fulfillment of the responsibilities laid on them. The role played by the cadre and commander makes a noteworthy and sometimes decisive contribution to the success and progress of their unit; conversely, they are the primarily responsible for any shortcoming committed in their unit.

Over the recent past, there have been a great many cases of indiscipline within the army and also in its relationships with various localities. Due to an inadequate understanding, no inquiry has been conducted into the responsibilities of cadres and commanders; instead, disciplinary measures have been taken only against the persons directly responsible for the consequences. This course of action has led to a slackening of discipline and to injustice in passing judgments and meting out punishments. Severity has been shown toward the low echelon while tolerance was displayed in dealing with the high level. A number of irresponsible cadres have relaxed management, thus enabling the troops to freely transgress discipline with serious consequences without, however, being dealt with severely and righteously. As a result, discipline has continued to

slacken off and many incidents have repeatedly occurred in these units because in organizing the enforcement of discipline, cadres and commanders have neither provided education to prevent such a situation nor taken positive measures to this effect. This is precisely the reason for the lack of both internal unity and army-people solidarity. The question of discipline and that of unity are one, for only by enforcing a strict discipline can one achieve concentrated uniformity and only on the basis of such uniformity can one build up unity. Conversely, unity can grow strong and stable only if it is based on concentrated uniformity.

Some comrades hold that because of its low standards and weak capabilities or because of objective circumstances, the army has been affected and influenced by the negative aspects of society. We do not deny these causes but if we consider them to be the principal ones which have weakened the army's discipline, we will then be unable to explain why--of two units placed under the same circumstances, stationed side by side in the same area or belonging to the same division or corps--one has not committed any serious breach of discipline in a period of a quarter or year while another is known for frequent cases of desertion, property loss, infraction of disciplinary regulations on army-people relationships and so forth. Speaking of responsibility, one must first base it on a great will-power, an ability to determine an ideal target, a peace of mind in building the army, a confidence in and enthusiasm about it, a pride in and attachment to it and on the view that it is a large family where comrades-in-arms are blood brothers. Only by doing so can one entirely devote one's heart, mind and attention to the building of one's unit and can one focus all one's thinking on the fulfillment of the functions and responsibilities entrusted.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DISCIPLINARY TRAINING IN MILITARY REGION ONE INTENSIFIED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Jun 82 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen Hoang Dan: "Promote Forging of Discipline To Raise Combat Strength"]

[Text] After conducting for more than 3 years the movement "to develop the good nature and raise the combat strength" of the people's armed forces and after implementing for nearly 2 years the directive No 78/CT-TM on the duty of "the entire army to act according to orders and regulations", many units in Military Region 1 have made an obvious progress in discipline enforcement. In many companies, there has been no incident requiring disciplinary action over the past year. Only in a small number of units has there been steady progress in matters of discipline, while some individual units have relaxed discipline.

Cadres at all levels in the military region are studying the principal causes of the uneven and sometimes slow progress in discipline enforcement in order to find out the practical and most effective measures to vigorously and steadily promote discipline training.

At present, many comrades are stressing the objective causes which have affected discipline training such as the low standards of cadres, especially those at the basic level, the difficulties currently plaguing our economy and the presence of many negative phenomena in our society. These objective causes are real and have influenced army discipline. But the question is why, under the same circumstances a number of units have made great progress in maintaining discipline while many others have made no progress at all and have even regressed. To date, the reason our army has fulfilled all missions, overcome all difficulties and vanquished all enemies is that we have taken firm hold of the objective situation, developed our subjective efforts to a high degree and overcome objective difficulties instead of feeling helpless in their presence.

Therefore, while recognizing the existence of objective causes, the cadres at all levels in the military region are carefully investigating the subjective causes which lie in the guidance exercised by party organizations to enhance discipline and also in the educational and managerial task done by commanders at all echelons.

In our opinion, the slow progress in discipline enforcement is due to the following principal causes:

--First, it is the failure of many comrades to fully realize the role of discipline in army building, to consider it important to inculcate a sense of discipline into their units and especially to intensively and regularly concentrate their efforts on discipline training.

--Though aware of the role of discipline, some comrades have, when looking for the cause of indiscipline, unduly stressed the objective ones and have consequently believed that the situation can neither be corrected quickly nor be remedied through the action of any single unit.

With that in mind, these comrades have become perplexed and cannot find a way out when training their troops in discipline and when enforcing it.

--Though having realized the importance of discipline as well as the need to avoid emphasizing the objective causes but to bring into play their own subjective efforts and those of party organizations, other comrades have failed to take uniform and continuous measures to enforce discipline. When faced with a lax discipline, they cope with the situation in a passive fashion and when discipline improves somewhat, they fail to concentrate on continuously training their troops into really disciplined ones.

After inspecting and carefully studying the situation in many well-disciplined units and in those with a loose discipline, we have come to conclusion that the reason some cadres have set a good example in keeping discipline and in actively leading and organizing their troops' training is not because they have encountered less difficulties than others and that those who have personally transgressed discipline and neglected their troops' training have met with more difficulties than others.

It can be asserted that wherever slow progress is made in discipline enforcement, it is because in performing discipline training, we have either an erroneous view or an inadequate understanding of this task, because we have not yet concentrated our efforts on providing a regular and continuous discipline training and also because we have failed to set good examples for our units.

Experiences drawn from good units have demonstrated that to provide a basic and steady discipline training, it is necessary to carry it out uniformly, thoroughly and continuously. Specifically speaking, it is necessary to satisfactorily carry out the following tasks:

--The Willpower of Cadres and Their Sense of Discipline Must Be Enhanced

It is common knowledge that to satisfactorily accomplish some task, there must be someone--in this connection, a cadre--to organize its execution. Therefore, in developing discipline and training troops in discipline, it is first necessary to focus on solving the problem of cadres by raising their sense of responsibility and their willpower. Education must be carried out repeatedly, in common as well as individually, in order to bring about a real change in each cadre. Concerning cadres with a low sense of discipline and a weak willpower, education and struggle must be combined to enable each and everyone of them to progress and fulfill his mission. Of course, it is necessary to severely deal with comrades who make no progress after undergoing several phases of education and

struggle; they must no longer be allowed to command troops. In our opinion, a definite part of the time spent holding yearly, quarterly and monthly meetings, training sessions and symposiums must always be set aside for the purpose of educating cadres. A struggle must be conducted in a straightforward, sincere and firm manner from the high level to the grassroots and must be directed toward each cadre.

The willpower of cadres and their sense of discipline must be enhanced simultaneously with improving their capacities for construction and combat, in general, and for the management and disciplinary training of troops, in particular. Apart from the advanced training given in schools, training courses and conferences--improvement based on actual facts also needs special attention. Model detachments must be built up in every unit to provide realistic data for the advanced training of cadres. At the military region level, we have been building a [model] division and two [model] districts [units]. In addition to the said division and two districts, we will build model schools and organs during the course of 1982.

The improvement of the qualities and capabilities of both cadres and combatants must be linked to the care for their mental and material life. Since the economic situation is still fraught with difficulties, if every unit takes care to improve the cadres' life according to sound guidelines, it will somewhat reduce the actual difficulties and will create favorable conditions for the cadres to concentrate on the principal task of standing ready to fight and of building, training and managing their units.

--The Management of Troops Must Always Be Satisfactory

In our opinion, the following tasks must be carried out satisfactorily while exercising management and providing discipline training: On the basis of organizing education to raise the standard of awareness and self-consciousness of cadres and combatants in keeping discipline, efforts must be exerted to implement a regular pattern of activity and to see that they act according to orders and regulations. It is absolutely necessary that combatants always act according to orders and regulations under all circumstances, in and out of their barracks and on both working days and holidays. In the barracks, commanding cadres must directly ensure that the established systems are always exactly implemented by soldiers. Outside the barracks, military control must be exercised very tightly to induce all outgoing armymen not only to self-consciously follow discipline regulations but also to exercise control in support of military control units.

Disciplinary compliments and rewards must be given out promptly, strictly and fairly. Units and individuals who have on their own kept discipline and have actively participated in military discipline training must be commended and rewarded appropriately. Those who have failed to keep strict discipline must be quickly detected and once they are detected, clear-cut and firm measures must be taken to compel them to strictly keep military discipline and state law. It is absolutely unwise to ignore any case of indiscipline and to neglect to deal with it specifically.

--It Is Necessary to Step up the Discipline Training of All Units in Each Area and Throughout the Military Region

To be successful, every task must be jointly carried out by everyone and every unit. Especially in matters of discipline training, if some people and some units do it but others do not, they will likely tend to rely on one another and to blame one another for any shortcoming.

To implement this policy in our military region, we have not only disseminated it among subordinate units and urged them to apply it but have also disseminated it among units not subject to our military region but stationed in our military region and have coordinated with these units in urging the implementation of this policy.

In addition to organizing the enforcement of discipline within the army, we have discussed with party organizations, the administration, sectors and mass organizations in various localities the need to jointly maintain political security and social order in each area and to create a favorable environment for maintaining military discipline. Participating in this task are army units and the public security, militia and self-defense forces who have been patrolling and standing guard day and night to maintain order and to ensure that discipline is kept by everyone including armymen.

The military region is trying to formulate a pattern of periodic activities and to gradually introduce it into all units on a village, district and provincial scale with the aim of reviewing the enforcement of military discipline and state law and jointly finding out the most effective measures to increasingly stabilize political security and social order. Naturally, discipline training must be conducted regularly and continuously from one year to another. Discontinuity is one of the reasons for the slow progress in discipline enforcement. To remedy this situation, all levels from the military region down to companies must draw up a plan to carry out discipline training and to keep discipline. Such a plan must clearly mention tasks one by one, fix the effective and expiry dates for each task and state which unit must carry it out and which commander must be held responsible for controlling and activating its implementation.

To steadily carry out discipline training and to firmly keep discipline, our entire military region will have to implement many tasks uniformly according to the specific guidelines and solutions mentioned above. These tasks are in essence a continuous struggle on the path of building and advancing the army and turning it into a regular and modern one.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES PUNISHED FOR THEFT OF STATE PROPERTY

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Jun 82 p 4

[Text] VNA--The Binh Tri Thien Provincial People's Court recently held a session in Hue City to try Dang Dinh Ho, Nguyen Thi Hue and their accomplices on charge of taking advantage of their functions and power to establish illegal connections and to steal state-owned goods with the aim of selling them at a profit in the free market.

From March to July 1980, Dang Dinh Ho, an employee in charge of distribution at the industrial products corporation subordinate to the commercial corporation, enticed a number of bad cadres to connive with Nguyen Thi Hue and Tran Thi Kim Huong, employees of the public works bureau of Hue City, and with Tran Thi Thanh Van, an employee of the Hue hospital, in taking away 1,137 safety work suits and 260 kgs of soap and selling these goods to two illegal traders named Pham Thi Hoa and Nguyen Thi Son. The culprits made a profit of over 47,000 dong and shared it between them.

In the two previous years of 1978 and 1979, with the assistance of Dang Dinh Ho and a number of bad employees in the industrial products corporation, Nguyen Thi Hue bought many kinds of goods for the agency [public works bureau] but put only a very small quantity of these goods into the stores and then took away hundreds of safety work suits, over 3,200 meters of fabric and many other kinds of valuable merchandise and sold all these goods in the free market to make an illegal profit of over 76,000 dong.

The Binh Tri Thien Provincial People's Court handed down the following sentences: Nguyen Thi Hue, 6 years in prison; Dang Dinh Ho, 5 years in prison; the remaining culprits each from 2 to 3 years of imprisonment with suspended execution of sentence; and confiscation of all the moneys representing the illegal profit made by them.

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL SEA DEPARTURES ARRESTED--The provincial military organ and the head of frontier defense of Binh Tri Thien Province have centralized leadership, reviewed experiences in preventing and struggling against sea departures, and strengthened forces in key areas. As a result almost all illegal sea departures were discovered in time and arrested. In addition, militia and self-defense forces arrested 2 seaborne infiltration attempts. The Dong Hoi and Dong Ha armed forces coordinated with the people's public security in organizing pursuit and detain drives at key points of route 9 and railroads, retrieving tens of thousands of dong of illegal goods to the state, making contributions to steadfastly maintaining the political security and social order and safety. [Text] [Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jun 82 p 2] 8418

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

FRENCH AID URGED AS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS PERSIST

Paris ESPRIT in French Jul-Aug 82 pp 153-157

[Article by Nguyen Duc-Nhuan: "An Even Blacker Spring?"]

[Text] This year, on 30 April, the Vietnamese people are celebrating the seventh anniversary of the country's reunification, with emptier bellies and even more despair at heart. The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party, which finally met from 27 March to 1st April, after over a year of preparations and stormy debates--which may have aroused some glimmers of hope for some small liberalization of the regime--gave birth to an even more monstrous mouse: a tightening of the already close grip of the party on the State and society. The tragic paradox mentioned by To Huu, a new member of the political bureau, during the preparation of the congress, remains unsolved. Namely, "how is it that a party so highly skilled in the art of revolution, ruling with a firm hand a strong state and a centralized economy, permanently mobilizing the masses, receiving generous support from the socialist bloc, how is it that such a party could not prevent the dramatic deterioration of its people's standards of living, especially after the country, which does not lack natural and human resources, had been reunited?"¹ Indeed, the country's economy has been steadily declining since 1975. The agricultural deficit hovers around 6 million tons of foodstuffs per year. At the same time, the population keeps growing by 2.6-3 percent per year; it reached 55 million inhabitants in 1981--60 million according to some East European indiscretions. Its structure is seriously imbalanced: 50 percent are under 15, the masculinity ratio in the 25-49 age bracket is 0.35. A large unproductive mass--not counting the million men of the regular army--is heavily weighing on a decreased and mostly feminine active population.

Famine could be avoided by spreading the food shortages: 10.50 kg of foodstuffs per person per month. Shortages are still greater for other essential goods: drugs, fabrics, soap, household articles and the indispensable "nuoc mam." With so little food, "we even lack chopsticks and toothpicks," exclaimed Le Thanh Nghi, another septuagenarian vice-prime minister.² The extensive heavy industrialization of the past five years consumed most of the investments and aid from the socialist bloc and proved of little use in the development of agriculture and the consumer goods industry.³

A Strategy of Underdevelopment

After its victory in 1975, the party had great hopes that the "huge war loot" consisting in industrial facilities left in the South by the capitalists would help the country's industrialization take off.⁴ According to party economists, the Saigon-Bienhoa area counted some 500 large facilities with ultra-modern equipment, estimated at 12 billion US dollars and, better still, a dense network of 18,000 small and medium-size enterprises employing close to 400,000 workers and technicians "with a high level of technical and management knowhow," who had all remained and were ready to cooperate with the new power. According to official estimates, with 2.2 dollars of raw materials and spare parts, these enterprises could produce 100 dollars' worth of goods. Of course, this extroverted industrial base which, as the government put it, had been intended to "make another South Korea of this area," would have to be partially reconverted to meet domestic requirements. However, as months went by, an essentially politically oriented management that changed according to conflicting guidelines from central and local party authorities, managed to place these factories in a state of permanent anarchy, thus reducing their production capacity by one third. Many of the technicians and workers had been drafted in the previous regime's army and were sent to rural areas to be reeducated; they were replaced by peasant-soldiers from the Center and North. Part of the equipment was sent to the North to create new enterprises. In the name of national independence, the authorities stopped importing a minimum of raw materials and spare parts, even though they could have produced 20-50 times their value in goods.

The extremely centralized planning turned into anarchy: factories equipped to produce bicycles were expected to produce leather goods, and conversely. The same thing happened with materials supplies. Controls were multiplied and discouraged initiatives from nationalized enterprises to obtain raw materials from local sources. To have bamboo shipped from Tayninh to Saigon (70 km) meant that 17 different authorizations had to be obtained, 6 purchase agreements signed and some 10 taxes paid. National banks refused to honor checks for payments between enterprises. The latter could not withdraw money from their accounts to pay their workers, unless they first obtained signatures from the "gang of four": the chamber of industry, the branch union, the (party) district and town committees.⁵

Surprisingly, in spite of the plummeting of the agricultural and industrial productions, Vietnam doubled its exportations to CEMA countries, especially to the USSR (250 million US dollars in 1976, 440 in 1981), not only for traditional raw materials (coal, natural rubber, lumber) but also for staples (eggs, fruits and vegetables, fish, tea and coffee, clothing and shoes) which are tragically lacking for domestic consumption.

Timid and Inconsistent Corrections

Vietnam's "invading" friendship for the other two Indochinese countries and its bloody "fraternity" with China finally precipitated an economic crisis and food shortages without precedent in the country. In the fall of 1979, at the initiative of a few more moderate leaders such as Pham Van Dong, Vo Guyen Giap and Nguyen Lam, the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee took a series of temporary measures to "free" (bung ra) production. For agricultural

food products, taxes were reduced to 10 percent of production, and compulsory deliveries to 30-40 percent. In cooperatives, the care and harvesting of crops were farmed out (Khoan sanpham) to households who must deliver fixed quotas and can keep the rest. The number of pigs and poultry raised by each household was no longer restricted, provided some were sold to the state at official prices. The rate of labor collectivization in the Mekong delta (the land and agricultural machinery were already under state control) was slowed down. The state tripled its purchase price for the excess agricultural production of individual farmers. In the industry, a piece-rate system was introduced to revive the workers' stakhanovist ardor. A measure of autonomy was granted to enterprises that could use rejects to produce additional goods for the free market.

These measures are too recent and their results still shaky and inconsistent. Partial tenant-farming has resulted in a slight increase in agricultural production in the North. In the Mekong delta, after the state tripled its purchasing prices, it could collect 1.2 million tons of paddy in 1981, twice as much as in 1979. By sharing the catch with fishermen, fishing cooperatives increased their catch by 60 percent and also reduced the number of boats on the run. In the consumer goods industries, there is trend toward producing more articles outside the plan, for the market, thus improving workers' wages. Outside their regular working hours, physicians can have private paying patients. Quantities of drugs manufactured in infinitesimal amounts from those received from families in France and the United States are reappearing on the market.

However, the burgeoning of an unofficial economy has generated a fantastic inflation, 150-200 percent per year, which cancels out the effect of the recent doubling of the salaries of the 3.5 million employed by the state, salaries which had remained unchanged for 20 years. In spite of recent encouragements, small private sector producers are working in total insecurity: no time limitation has been set for the temporary liberal measures, they can be revoked overnight and "ill-acquired" property confiscated. On the other hand, the state is unwittingly encouraging a prodigious growth of unofficial production within its own enterprises.

Faced with the real danger of explosion of the official economy, with Polish-type political risks, the party hard-liners (with Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, To Huu, Pham Hung) are making a strong comeback, pushing for a return to the good old Stalinian planning, even if that means further tightening the proletariat's belts. In addition, their common fear of a "Polish-type Solidarity" phenomenon could bring closer the Vietnamese and Chinese Stalinian leaders, with those from the USSR acting as go-betweens. The possible restalinization of the weak and drained Vietnam will surely increase, among the people and among the cadres, the number of those who will lose faith in the will and ability of the party "to actually make a step forward in improving the people's living conditions." In the middle of despair, the riots of hungry peasants, like those which occurred in Haiphong and Nghetinh during the winter of 1980, will become more frequent.

The number of boat-people—close to one million since April 1975—could increase dramatically. These "economic" refugees are fleeing a regime which, although it calls itself materialistic, is stifling any initiative of the

people to make a living outside the dictatorial and anti-economic scope of the party. A regime which, in the 1980 Constitution, proclaims that Marxism-Leninism is the sole basis for education, culture, letters and the arts (articles 38, 44, etc.).

A Hard-Line Congress

Faced with such a prospect, a few courageous official party intellectuals, such as Nguyen Khac Vien, supported by innovative leaders afraid to lose their influence, recently sent a petition to the Central Committee, taking the National Assembly as a witness. Vien is asking the party to alleviate "its monopoly on state and society activities." In his letter dated 21 June 1981, Vien insists that key economic positions be given to competent individuals, and that an end be put to the continual interference of party careerists who are still steeped in "the Maoist mentality of the big leap forward." The agricultural and industrial policies should be less "adventurous," "inconsistent," and should better answer the irreducible needs of the people. The grip of party propaganda on the media should be less "stupid and boring," to enable the latter to better "reflect the people's opinions," which could correct the government's mistakes before it is too late. Finally, self-criticism from the high officials responsible for the present economic collapse of the country would restore the people's confidence in its future.

However, the Fifth Congress does not seem to have heard the call of distress of Nguyen Khac Vien, director of Hanoi's foreign publishing presses. Measures were announced that will reinforce the grip of the party on all economic and social activities, and accelerate the collectivization of southern agriculture; these measures, it is true, are accompanied by promises of an increase in material incentives to workers. Certainly, the leaders have reached a difficult compromise, but in favor of the hard-liners (Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, Pham Hung, To Huu). Even General Giap, the victor of the two liberation wars, who has turned to scientific and technical development tasks since 1976, was dismissed from the political bureau. Should this hard-line trend be confirmed in future months, then the Vietnamese Communist Party would obviously assume the responsibility of keeping an inventive and laborious people in a state of material and moral destitution for a long time to come. In the eyes of the Vietnamese people, it is losing the credit it deserves for leading the two great resistance wars against imperialism.

Socialist France, aware of the heavy responsibilities it incurred in the past for furthering, through its lack of insight, the advent of a (proletarian) dictatorship regime instead of a more democratic evolution, is absolutely right in developing relations of aid and exchange with Vietnam, which finds itself isolated from the Western bloc since its intervention in Cambodia (the effect, not the objective of which was to put an end to Pol Pot's monstrous tyranny). Important scientific and technical cooperation agreements are about to be signed between the two countries. But we have the right to hope that today's socialist France will also, through concrete and substantial action, contribute to achieve a measure of democratization of the Vietnamese communist regime, a prerequisite to the development of a country which does not lack natural resources nor human capabilities, although they are as yet poorly used.

FOOTNOTES

1. Tohuu, REVUE DU COMMUNISME (RC), Hanoi, No 8, 1980, p 19.
2. ETUDES ECONOMIQUES (EE), Hanoi, No 4, 1980, pp 7, 21-22.
3. Le Thanh Nghi, RC, No 11, 1979, p 11.
4. W. Burchett in "Vietnam Un + Un = Un" [Vietnam One + One = One], Maspero, 1977, pp 243-247. EE, Hanoi, No 5, 1977, pp 13-28; No 6, 1979, pp 21-28.
5. Idem.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

COMBINING THREE INTERESTS IN PRODUCT CONTRACTS DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by Huu Tho: "Some Ideas About Three Interests in Agricultural Product Contracts"]

[Text] In recent days many theoreticians made in-depth analyses of the matters related to three interests and the harmonious combination of these interests to create a driving force for socioeconomic development. In the practical economic analyses of individual production and business units, the "three interests" concept was also constantly mentioned as a yardstick to evaluate whether the distributing job of such units had been done correctly or not.

Cooperatives and production collectives are socialist collective economic units in agriculture. Is there anything different from the state-operated units in the application of the "ensuring three interests" principle? When analyzing the results as well as shortcomings in carrying out the product contract policy, many localities usually consider the social interest as the level of contribution by obligation, the collective interest as the different funds and the laborers' interest as their share of income based on the number of days worked and output beyond what is assigned in their contract. Is it correct to understand that way?

Two Most Important Norms

The socialist revolution gives rise to new economic relationships and new economic interests. On the basis of the collective ownership of means of production, labor, land and natural resources, the socialist state properly use them for the interests of the working people throughout the country. As to the interests of society as a whole, as V.I. Lenin said, "once having seized the state power, the proletarian class has an interest that is the most basic and most vital one -- to raise the quantities of products and to increase on a large scale the producing power of society."* Thus the economic interests of society as a whole are first of all in increased social product and continued increase of its producing power.

* V.I. Lenin: "Complete Works," Volume 44, Progress Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, p 422.

To increase the gross social product is the first important thing. But the socialist state, for the interests of all people, must get hold of products to ensure the consumption need of society as a whole, a total socioeconomic development and the national defense need. Therefore, from the standpoint of agricultural production in general, as well as grain production in particular, on the basis of building and ceaselessly consolidating the socialist production relationships, the interests of society as a whole, as I understand them, do not solely lie in the level of contribution by obligation but first of all are reflected in two norms: the volume of social products and the volume of products that the state gets hold of by various means. These two norms also represent the collective and laborers' interests if they are correctly distributed. To raise the volume of grain production is the most important thing to do to increase the commodity-type grain product. However, if we do not know the way to correctly do it, we may not have such an increase. And if we want to increase the commodity product without increasing the social product, under the current conditions -- the average per capita grain production being only 275 kilograms a year -- the only way to do is to reduce the necessary product of agricultural laborers. If this happens, it will lead to other adverse consequences.

If such is our understanding, from the standpoint of ensuring the interests of all people in regard to grain production, product contracts have brought about more than one piece of good news. Everybody says that since the new contract system was adopted the social product has clearly increased and the level of obligation has been fulfilled. Even the excess paddy obtained beyond the assigned level by individual cooperative members, even though they can benefit from and have the right to use it, is not absolutely their own interest. Without that excess paddy how could farmers have anything with which they could exchange for nitrate fertilizer from the state? Even in the recent preharvest period in mid-April cooperative members in a number of provinces were still selling nonobligation paddy to the state to exchange for nitrate fertilizer from it. The reason why farmers in Hai Hung Province had nearly 30,000 tons of excess paddy to sell as nonobligation paddy to the state in a year is the fact that they exceeded the assigned level of paddy production. This does not include the fact that thanks to the increase of the social product farmers in a number of localities have been able to keep small reserves, which they would need in the years of crop losses when usually they would have to rely on state assistance. This volume of product, from the standpoint of the interest of society as a whole, cannot be considered as absolutely the interest of individuals.

Interests Related to Production Plans

In a socialist society, the economic interests of all people are achieved in basic units. Since cooperatives and production collectives are the socialist collective economic units in agriculture, therefore:

On the one hand, the collective interests of these units are closely linked with the interests of all people and of individuals through a correct implementation of the guidelines and tasks of the state plan in terms of the volume of products -- a part of the gross social product -- and the taxable products sold to the state in accordance with two-way economic contracts -- a component among the products in the possession of the state.

On the other hand, cooperatives and production collectives are responsible for expanding their own production and stabilizing and ceaselessly improving the standard of living of their members.

From the standpoint of product distribution, we can distribute only the products we make. To carry out production plans is a condition for gradually building a new production structure as we move toward the socialist large-scale production and the most important condition for fulfilling the obligation of different units, increasing their various funds and achieving distribution based on the regular number of working days. But how do we encourage all units and individuals to reach and surpass production plan goals?

In managerial work there are some measures that act very delicately on the object of management like some sort of art, hence the usual mentioning of management as an art. The product contract measure, which we are applying, creates a strong motivation, being by no means the only one, for laborers and their families to develop the spirit of collective ownership as they try to surpass the level of assigned production. This motivation, according to our study, is being made evident in the following aspects:

First, to ask that the state and the central, provincial and district levels carry out the assigned contracts faithfully and that service and production activities be improved so as to allow them to surpass the assigned level.

Second, to ask that the cooperatives' specialized units closely follow the technical programs assigned, i. e., to ask for better cooperation in each unit, and to check them closely to see if that is done.

Third, to strive to do extra work by using all of the spare time of any kind of one's family, to try to learn and apply new techniques and to invest additional savings (while we are short of capital) in practicing intensive cultivation in the assigned ricefield.

The first and second aspects are giving rise to new and strict needs that require all echelons, sectors and members fulfill their responsibilities toward production. That is what we wish to see happen. Although presently it is not easy to ensure favorable conditions for production, everybody wishes that we would not create unnecessary difficulties and would be very correct in handling economic relationships.

About the third aspect some people express a concern about the fact that "cooperative members now seem to care only for surpassing the assigned level set for the ricefields they have accepted to till." To analyze this psychological state is very interesting. Here we have an open -- clearly seen -- phenomenon and a concealed one. The open phenomenon lies in the fact that every cooperative member tries very hard, up to the point of fully devoting himself to the effort, to surpass the assigned production level. But to do so means he must cross the compulsory "threshold" that is the plan goal, i. e., the starting point for any excess production to be made by himself can only be after he has ensured fulfilling the plan -- this also involves the social interest, the collective interest and all three interests as analyzed above, provided the assigned goals are rational.

Therefore, the collective interest and all three interests are first of all manifested in reaching the plan goal, which creates favorable conditions for the assigned contracts to be carried out better. However, since the cooperatives are the socialist collective economic units, they must prepare for expanded reproduction in their own unit and ensure the living of all their members; consequently, all their funds -- accumulation fund, public benefit fund and reserve fund -- are very important.

Product Contracts and Distribution

In a socialist collective agricultural production unit, what are the characteristics of distribution and what effects do product contracts have on carrying out the principle of socialist distribution?

First of all, in a socialist collective economic unit, the products of cooperatives and production collectives are collectively owned by their members. After all production costs and the obligation to the state are taken care of, how the rest is distributed is discussed among all members in accordance with the party and state principles and policies. Consequently, cooperative members are very afraid that production may not reach the plan level and production costs may be too high, do not feel reassured when the obligation level is far from fulfilled and have the tendency to want to receive larger distributed shares and to put less in the cooperatives' funds. Along with the policy aimed at stabilizing the grain obligation, product contracts have helped to reduce the collectives' production costs. If the results obtained are greater, cooperative members will feel encouraged. As the struggle to ensure the right amounts of funds has been going on in the cooperatives for decades, the party and state must provide guidance and make sure their policies are correctly implemented.

So far the remuneration cooperative members get is the income obtained from the number of working days. The value of working days can be high or low depending on the results of production and the cooperatives' overall managerial work. As agriculture is still dependent on nature, which determines which year has good or bad crops and how good a year may be, the reserve funds of both cooperatives and

families are necessary. The income of each laborer also depends on whether he works many or few days and whether wages are "cheap" or "expensive." Consequently, cooperative members are concerned not only about the volume of production and the amount of paddy exceeding the assigned level but also about the number of days they work. At times, they may like the "worry not about both working days and work points" situation, but basically it is what they are very afraid of. When distribution is done in a unified manner, they are also concerned about the proportional relationships among various sectors and occupations. Farmers feel encouraged because the "worry not about both working days and work points" situation does not exist much in rice growing. But if uniform contracts are not adopted for crops, animals and occupations, new contradictions will appear.

When distribution is made among cooperative members, unlike in other sectors, cooperatives and production collectives distribute both cash and material resources. Both are distributed on the basis of labor. But while there is a shortage of grain, the basic product of society as a whole, farmers are very interested in the shares of material resources distributed. Therefore, product contracts are what both cooperatives and members want: the former need to fulfill their production plans to be able to carry out the distribution plans on their own initiative, and the latter want to surpass the assigned level because the excess amount will be the share they will directly receive in material resources. Since there are in the countryside people who are well-off and people who still encounter difficulties, it is necessary to develop the spirit of mutual help while proceeding with the distribution of material resources.

In the present situation, according to our study, the distribution of overall income in the cooperatives (in cash) does not encounter any major problem. If they make profit, by regulation they will surrender 50 percent of this profit for accumulation, put 20 percent into the public benefit fund and 10 percent into the reserve fund and divide the rest into halves, one-half to add to wages and one-half to use as bonuses. As to the share of material resources distributed, attention is to be paid to a few things. According to current regulation, after a sufficient amount is used as seeds and to pay tax and to sell to the state under the two-way economic contract, the amount of grain left is used as follows: 1-2 percent to be put into the public benefit fund and 1 percent into the reserve fund, 10 percent to be sold at regulated prices as an aid to the families that encounter difficulties, first of all the families of wounded soldiers and dead heroes, and the rest to be divided among laborers. In principle, it is the right way to do. But since some families do not deliver the right amount of product assigned and others are exempted from delivering the normal amount while distribution must be based on the number of man-days set in the plan, in some localities the material-resources funds decrease, or generally speaking, do not increase proportionally to the rate of increase of production. In Thai Binh Province, in the 1981 tenth-month rice crop, the grain funds of its cooperatives increased by 12.69 percent as compared with the same crop in 1980, but the volume of production increased by 23.24 percent.

The volume of production assigned in product contracts is dependent on three factors: the nature of soil, level of investment and progressive techniques applied. It is necessary to stabilize this assigned volume of production for a few years so as to make the people being assigned product contracts feel reassured to practice intensive cultivation, and not to deplete the soil, but under production conditions that remain unchanged. When the level of investment is raised and progressive techniques are applied, the assigned volume of production must increase. As the result of a lack of this understanding, some localities, when drafting the third 5-year production plan, did not increase in a proportional manner the figures for gross output, number of man-days and funds of all kinds. This is a matter that should be further studied and receive strict guidance.

Tendencies Toward Private Ownership

As the new contract system is carried out -- in fact, there are only some changes in the assigning of a few jobs related to the end product -- one thing has become evident: laborers feel encouraged to work. Again a new question has been raised: "Does this contract system, which lets three jobs related to the rice plants be done on a family scale, further develop the farmers' tendencies toward private ownership?"

The classics of Marxism-Leninism often analyze farmers as having two facets -- labor and private ownership -- and the former being the principal one. We should also remember that this evaluation applies to the free farmers. Once they joined the cooperatives and production collectives, the free farmers have become the collectivized ones, whose tendencies toward private ownership still exist but do not increase everyday. The struggle to overcome the tendencies toward private ownership and individualism of cooperative members (we can say even among ourselves) is a permanent long-term task that should not be neglected. Under the old contract system, the sense of responsibility of cooperative members in production was not great. We also should not simply think that when work is done in a "concentrated" manner, there are no favorable conditions for the tendencies toward private ownership to develop. That is not true, both in theory and in practice. Under the piece-work contract system, many people were after work points and thus did a sloppy and careless job. As they harrowed the fields, they weaved through them quickly. As they transplanted rice seedlings, they did a good job only for the few rows near the edges. As they carried manure to the fields, they threw away some along the way to lighten the load, which had been weighed for counting work points, and when they arrived, they dumped it near the edges of the ricefields to be fertilized. As they harvested the crop, they did not care about losses of grain and liked to harvest the poorer ricefields rather than the good ones. As they threshed grain, they left some on the straws so that they could do the job more quickly and retrieve some grain later as they would bring a share of straws home to feed water buffaloes. It was not true that everybody was working sloppily. Where management was good the problem was not that bad. Good people still did a good job, but there were not very many of them. The old contract

system made laborers feel they were not attached to the end product, nor interested to any considerable degree in collective production, but rather willing to get high work points. Was it not a manifestation of the tendencies toward private ownership? Was that situation a common and difficult one? Although we were struggling hard to overcome it, control and verification of actual harvest was always a difficult matter in farming.

Now under the new contract system, cooperative members are interested in the end product, do not and do not let other people do a sloppy and careless job. The spirit of collective ownership in terms of labor and use of land is heightened. But do not think that the tendencies toward private ownership have disappeared. Nowadays, in rice production, they are not after work points but are after volume of production. That is better than before. But a new problem has appeared: at any cost, even by taking improper measures, cooperative members want to surpass the assigned volume of production. Only after a year we have clearly seen that the struggle between cooperatives and members usually takes place in the following aspects:

- To demand lowering the assigned volume of production. Many localities have to assign lower volume of production than the average one of 3-5 years.

- To demand total or partial reduction of the assigned volume of production when crops suffer from damages. Losses may be negligible, but reduction being asked is considerable. Losses may involve a small area, but reduction being asked is for an entire plot. Some people, therefore, say that cooperative members want to get all when the crops are good, but when there are losses, they demand a reduction.

- To fight to demand plowing and water before other people, without observing the common schedule.

- To fail to deliver the right quantity of product, including both the main product being paddy and straws and stubbles for draft animals.

- Where the management of draft animals is incorrect, to take turns using these animals leads to excessive use, as there exists the phenomenon of giving plowers "handouts" to increase the number of plowings, etc.

And thus a number of manifestations of the tendencies toward private ownership has been partially overcome, and a number of others has appeared. If I have to make a comparison, I do not have enough evidence to say whether the tendencies toward private ownership of farmers and cooperative members are now worse or better than before. But one thing is clear: there are new manifestations that need to be watched. In the past, the fact that a number of people had worked sloppily and carelessly was harmful to both cooperatives and society, and as a result, we could not say cooperative members were getting any additional benefit. With a

work day earning only .2 dong, how many days would they have to work to get any additional benefit? Consequently, they turned to the 5 percent ricefields because the income earned from the collectives was low. That was a situation that caused concern. Today, the style of private ownership as I have analyzed above is beneficial for cooperative members while society still is not deprived of anything in terms of volume of production, but collectives do suffer some harm in some aspects. (I say only in some aspects. As to how the collective interest is seen in a general manner, it has been analyzed earlier.) The struggle to realize the slogan, "cooperatives are homes, members are homeowners," is a course of action to be sustained by such measures as political education, economic management and sometimes even administrative action. For instance, the effort to ensure a rational assigned volume of production requires that we do a good job in setting economic and technical norms and in adopting and implementing bylaws, as well as pursue ideological education.

As I present some above ideas, I want to affirm this: only when we can harmoniously combine the three interests can they create a real motivation for socio-economic development. The harmonious combination of the three interests is a struggle to resolve contradictions for the benefit of these interests, the manifestations of which may be different at times but must be detected in time in order to be resolved.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

SOVIET COMMENTS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TASKS OF VIETNAM

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 82 (signed to press 3 Jun 82) pp 78-83

[Article by Major A. Nikul'chenkov, candidate of historical sciences: "By Creative Course: The Third Five-Year Plan of Socialist Vietnam"]

[Text] A major event occurred in the life of the fraternal Vietnamese people, in the history of communist and worker movement, the Fifth Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party which took place in Hanoi from 27 to 31 March 1982. This was a party congress which had a famous combat path of selfless struggle, great victories and accomplishments behind it. True to the Marxist-Leninist teaching, following the wise precepts of its founder and leader Ho Chi Minh, the Communist Party of Vietnam grew up into a guiding and directing force of society and became the acknowledged leader of the heroic Vietnamese people.

The Communist Party of Vietnam came to its congress, unified and organizationally strengthened, closely tied to the masses by the Marxist-Leninist Party. It numbers in its ranks about 1.730 million communists. During the last 5 years, the party accepted 370,000 new members, and 85.9 percent of them were educated by the Union of Communist Youth of Ho Chi Minh.

The documents and materials of the congress, primarily the political report of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee to the Fifth Congress which was given by the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee Comrade Le Duan made an extensive Marxist-Leninist analysis of the features of the period experienced by the country, summarized the results of the multifaceted activity of the party in the Second Five-Year Plan, analyzed the achievements and shortcomings, and outlined new frontiers for social and economic development in the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) and for the 1980's.

In the years which have passed since the Fourth CPV Congress, the Vietnamese people have achieved considerable advances in realizing the tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan. They could have been even greater, if the peaceful labor had not been obstructed by the forces of international reaction, the hostile anti-Vietnamese policy of the ruling circles in China, and a number of objective difficulties of the transitional period to socialism.

As a result of the many years of plunderous war, the American imperialists inflicted enormous damage on Vietnam. The material damage in North Vietnam was 22 billion dong. This is more than double the cost expression of the main national economic funds of this part of the country. In South Vietnam, the transoceanic militarists bombed 10 million hectares of land. Ten percent of the land was poisoned by chemicals. The enemy destroyed about 1.5 million head of cattle. Seven million people were left without cows and 3 million without work.

The Maoist leadership of China, which sees the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as the main obstacle to its hegemonistic plans in Southeast Asia, is doing everything possible to obstruct the development of Vietnam. The peaceful spring of 1975 was only a brief respite for the republic. For almost 3 years with the direct instigation and support of Beijing a war raged on the south-west borders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, unleashed by the pro-Beijing clique of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary. After the fall of the regime of Beijing henchmen in Kampuchea, the Chinese leadership drastically increased the number of armed provocations against Vietnam, and in February-March 1979, unleashed a large-scale war, throwing into the attack 600,000 soldiers supported by tanks and artillery. But the interventionists encountered the decisive repulse of the entire Vietnamese people. As before, they were supported by the Soviet Union and other states of socialist cooperation. Forced to retreat, the Chinese occupiers at the order of Beijing stole and destroyed everything on their path. They ruined four temporarily seized provincial centers, 320 villages, 904 schools and 430 hospitals and medical stations.

"Our people," said Comrade Le Zuan at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, "bore the first attack by the perfidious intrigues of the ruling circles in China, protected the independence and freedom of the motherland and socialism in Vietnam, fulfilled their international duty in relation to the fraternal peoples of Kampuchea and Laos, and made an active contribution to the protection of national independence and peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia."

But Beijing apparently did not draw a conclusion from the failure of the aggression: until now we have heard threats of "teaching Vietnam a second lesson," the tension on the Vietnamese-Chinese border remains, and the concentration of troops and naval forces of China continues. Because of the gross interference of the imperialist circles of the West and Beijing in the internal affairs of Laos and Kampuchea, Vietnam is giving them comprehensive aid, including armed protection of revolutionary conquests. According to the concluded bilateral agreements, units and subunits of the Vietnamese People's Army are stationed on the territory of these countries. The forced diversion of considerable people and material resources for defense needs of course creates additional difficulties for the peaceful construction of a socialist Vietnam.

The Western countries and China are attempting to surround the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with a ring of economic blockade. Until now Washington not only has not set up diplomatic relations with Vietnam, but even refuses to compensate for the enormous damage inflicted on it by the intervention of the United States and its puppets. With the incitement from across the ocean and from China, the Common Market and a number of other capitalist countries have halted aid to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

However, even under these difficult conditions, Vietnam is going forward, successfully resolving the extremely complicated problems. Its considerable accomplishments were indicated in the political report of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee's report to the congress. This is the rapid unification of the country, establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on national scales and the first advances in the socialist

reconstruction of South Vietnam, resistance which was given to the Chinese aggressors. This is the development, national discussion and adoption of a new constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the constitution for the transitional period to socialism, strengthening of the union with Laos and Kampuchea, expansion of cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states, and the entrance of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam into the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance.

The advances of Vietnam on the economic front are considerable. The Vietnamese people were able in a short time to overcome the severe consequences of the aggressive war of the United States and the Beijing hegemonists, and solve many urgent social and economic problems in time. The class of the comprador bourgeoisie in the south was completely eliminated and socialist transformations were partially implemented in the private capitalist sector of industry and trade. The first advances were made in cooperative agriculture in the southern provinces of Vietnam. The production relationships in the north are being improved. The economic facilities that were destroyed during the war years were mainly restored. National redistribution of social labor was started. Millions of workers obtained the opportunity to work.

The structure of the economy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam radically changed. Socialist property is now its basis. The socialist sector of the economy in 1980 produced 57.7 percent of the gross social product of the country. The changes in the economy resulted in changes in the class composition of the society. The indestructible union of workers and peasants became the main support for the state. The working class grew and was strengthened. The number of industrial workers rose during the second five-year plan by 24 percent and reached 1.7 million people. The 1.6 million workers engaged in small and handicraft industry are also an enormous production force.

Cooperation of agriculture has been completed in the north. The peasants of the southern part of the country are following this same path. Their consciousness, political, cultural and technical level have noticeably risen.

The intelligentsia is giving all of their efforts and capabilities to the construction of socialism and the protection of the motherland. Its number increased by 78 percent during the five-year plan (1976-1980).

Socialist Vietnam has definite achievements in the development of productive forces and has expanded the material-technical base. The main funds in all sectors of production have become greater by 10.2 million dong, or by 91 percent.

During the five-year plan, the gross agricultural products rose by almost 19 percent. The planted areas expanded by 2 million hectares. The rural workers were sent 18,000 tractors, hundreds of automobiles and different agricultural machines. Animal husbandry was further developed. The head of buffaloes which are still the main traction force in the village reached 2.316 million in 1980, and the number of cows was 1.661 million and pigs 10 million.

The advances in industry are perceptible. At the end of the five-year plan, the output of industrial products increased as compared to 1975 by 17.3 percent, and in machine construction, by 60 percent. The production facilities in power engineering rose by 100,000 kilowatts, in the coal industry by 2 million T, and in the cement industry by 500,000 T. About 1700 km of railroad tracks, 30,000 m of bridges, 3800 km of highways and 4000 m of moorings were restored and rebuilt. The transportation fleet of the country was replenished.

The Vietnamese Communist Party, and the republic government are showing great concern for the development of education and culture. Socialist Vietnam is the first country in Southeast Asia that has ended mass illiteracy: in the north in 1969, and in the southern provinces in 1978. Today there are 12.5 million students in the secondary schools, and 150,000 in the higher educational institutions. Together with the auditors of courses on improving general educational level and qualification, the number of students in the country is 16 million, in other words, almost every third inhabitant of Vietnam is now studying.

However, the advances which the Vietnamese people have made in the construction of socialism, as noted at the congress, do not completely correspond to the labor expended and the capital investments. The food problem has not yet been resolved and labor resources are not always used efficiently. There is still a strained situation in transportation, in providing industry with raw material and power. A great imbalance still exists between export and import. The market prices are unstable and the financial system is experiencing serious difficulties.

All of these difficulties were induced primarily by the weakness of the economy in which small goods production is still widespread, by the enormous destruction during the prolonged warfare to repulse the aggression, and a shortage of experience of constructing socialism. As a consequence of these and other reasons, a number of indicators in the Second Five-Year Plan were not fulfilled.

Heading the construction of socialism in the country, the Communist Party of Vietnam concentrates attention of the communists, all workers on the unresolved problems and shortcomings. The party does not close its eyes to the difficulties and speaks honestly about the errors allowed. It mobilizes the party organizations, broad masses of urban and rural workers to correct them.

The new stage of development of the national economy which encompasses the period from 1981 to 1985, as well as up to 1990 is especially important. The line developed by the Communist Party of Vietnam for the construction of the socialist economy, as indicated in the documents of the congress, is to "accelerate socialist industrialization, create the material and technical base for socialism, and switch the economy from small to large socialist production." The main content of socialist industrialization in the Third Five-Year Plan and in the 1980's is to concentrate all forces on developing agriculture, on converting it into a major socialist industry.

By successively continuing the general course for construction of socialism, the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam defined the following basic social and economic tasks for the 1980's:

to satisfy the most urgent needs, gradually stabilize and improve the material and cultural level of the population, primarily to radically resolve the food problem; to better provide for the needs of the population for education, medical services, housing and transportation, improve the system of children's preschool institutions and better satisfy the minimum needs for the population for consumer goods;

continue the creation of a material and technical base for socialism, by primarily developing agriculture, output of consumer goods and the production of goods for export; to accelerate technical progress in other sectors of the national economy and to prepare for the more advanced development of heavy industry at the subsequent stages;

complete socialist transformation in the provinces of the southern part of the country; continue improvement in the socialist production relationships in North Vietnam, and strengthen socialist production relationships in the entire country;

strengthen national defense and keep safety in order.

Redistribution of labor resources on the scale of the entire country will continue in 1981-1985. Millions of able-bodied people are being resettled from the densely populated zones and cities to the sparsely populated corners to create new economic regions, build important irrigation, transportation and industrial facilities.

The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam advanced a strict regime of economy as the long-term state political program. The task is set of conserving 10 percent of the power, raw materials, materials, etc. for the national economy. "We must live in accordance with the results of our labor and not consume more than production allows us," Comrade Le Zuan noted at the congress. "It is necessary to satisfy the vital needs, but be able to bear difficulties in the name of independence and freedom of the motherland, to guarantee expanded reproduction and to build the material and technical base for socialism."

The basic directions for social and economic development in the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) stipulates an annual increase in the production of agricultural products by 6-7 percent, industrial products by 4-5 percent, and the national income by 4.5-5 percent.

The congress set great tasks before the rural workers. The main efforts are being aimed at the development of plant growing. It remains to achieve an average annual production of 17 million tons of food, that is 3.6 million tons more than the average annual level of the second five-year plan. In this case, the state procurements will average 3.5 million tons per year. In animal husbandry, the emphasis is on increasing the head of cattle, pigs and poultry.

In heavy industry, the primary attention in the current five-year plan is focused on power engineering. A long-term plan will be formulated in the near future for electrification for 15-20 years which stipulates the development of hydro- and thermal power engineering, large and small plants. The control figure for generating electricity in 1985 is 5.5-6 billion kilowatt-hours. Coal extraction will be 8-9 million tons. The oil and gas industry will be further developed. The main efforts are concentrated on exploration and subsequent operation of the oil and gas fields on the continental shelf in the south of the country. Exploration and operation of the natural gas fields on the North Vietnamese plain will be continued.

Machine construction and the electrical engineering industry of course have key importance for all sectors of the national economy. Machine construction in the current five-year plan has been set the task of guaranteeing repair of machines and equipment, production of machines and spare parts for agriculture, light, coal-extracting industry, power engineering and transportation. In the Third Five-Year Plan it is planned to complete construction of a plant for manufacture of diesel engines in [Go Da], ship wharves in Ha Long and [Faryng], and reconstruction of the locomotive-building plant in Gia Lam.

Important tasks have to be resolved by the metallurgical industry: to use more completely the facilities of the metallurgical combine in Thai Thai Nguyen and enterprises in the south, and precisely organize the collection of metal scrap so that by the end of the five-year plan the production of rolled steel products will have doubled as compared to 1981. It is planned to increase the extraction of tin in Tinh Tuc, Son Duong and to expand the facilities for extraction of chromites, lead and zinc. The manufacture of chemical fertilizers, mainly phosphorus and nitrogen, will be brought to 350,000-400,000 T.

The total volume of capital investments to construction was defined in the current five-year plan as 16-18 billion dong. The chief efforts are aimed at completing the most important objects of the national economy which define technical progress.

Thus, the highest forum of the Vietnamese communists advanced inspirational and at the same time complicated tasks. Their resolution requires mobilization of all forces, equipment and resources of the country.

The results of the first year of the Third Five-Year Plan indicated that significant changes are outlined in economic construction. The country has produced a record quantity of food, 15 million tons. The new system of wages and the introduction of the principles of material incentive into industry and agriculture are creating the conditions for the further improvement in supplying the population with food and consumer goods.

The volume of production of industrial products reached the planned indicators in 1981 and somewhat exceeded the 1980 level. The country obtained more coal, electricity, tin, sugar, canned food, marine products and goods of local and handicraft industry than in the preceding year. Definite progress has been made in capital construction.

The steady expansion of comprehensive cooperation and interaction serves as a reliable basis for the successful development of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the socialist path, as in other countries of our cooperation. The relationships of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam which is based on a strong foundation of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism are strengthened from year to year. The agreement on friendship that was concluded in November 1978 and elevated Soviet-Vietnamese relations to a qualitatively new level became their apex. True to its international debt, the Soviet Union is giving Vietnam not only effective help in restoring and developing the economy, but also in protecting the independence of the country, and their revolutionary conquests from the encroachments of the imperialist and expansionist forces. "The Soviet Union highly values the friendship and cooperation with socialist Vietnam," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed. "Our people will be a reliable friend and ally of the heroic Vietnamese people in the future as well."

The delegates to the higher forum of the Vietnamese communists expressed strong confidence that the fraternal ties of our two countries will become even stronger in the upcoming years, and even more intensive. "The solidarity and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union were and are the cornerstone for the foreign policy of our party and state," Comrade Le Duan proclaimed from the tribune of the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam. "Close unity and comprehensive cooperation with the USSR, this is the principle, this is the strategy, and at the same time this is revolutionary spirit. Our party is faced with the task of educating generations in the spirit of this principle, in the spirit of deep understanding of this strategy in order to convert it into a moving force for the development of our revolutionary business to complete victory."

With the cooperation of the Soviet Union, about 200 important national economic facilities were built and reconstructed in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam by 1980. In the current five-year plan, it is planned to erect 40 facilities with joint efforts. Construction is already underway on the largest hydropower system in Southeast Asia, Hoa Binh, with output of 1.920 million kilowatts, the TES [Falay] with output of 640,000 kilowatts, the power transmission line [Falay-Vin] extending almost 500 kilometers. There are also the coal pits and mines in [Kaoshon], Mong Duong, Van Don and Mau Ca, the bridge across the Red River in Hanoi, etc. On the continental shelf in the southern Socialist Republic of Vietnam, preparation is underway for development of oil and gas fields. Our country is supplying equipment for the tin ore mine in Tinh Tuc, the apatite ore mine in Lao Cai, for the super-phosphate plant in [Lam Thao], cement plant in [Binshon]. The commodity turnover between our countries will double in the Third Five-Year Plan.

The space flight of the international Soviet-Vietnamese crew of Viktor Gorbatko and Pham Tuan which carried the banner of our friendship above the planet has become a symbol of brotherhood and high level of cooperation.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a full-fledged member of the family of fraternal countries which are included in the socialist cooperation, in the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. In accordance with the comprehensive program for socialist economic integration, the CEMA member countries

are helping Vietnam to develop the most diverse sectors of the economy. In January 1981, a general agreement was signed for multilateral cooperation of the interested countries included in the CEPA, for promotion of the accelerated development of science and technology of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for the period to 1990.

Soviet-Vietnamese military cooperation received further development. Mutual visits of delegations, trips of commanders, political workers and different specialists to exchange experience of training and education of personnel, party-political work, development of military equipment, cultural and athletic contacts of our armies promote strengthening of friendship and military camaraderie, international education of the fighters and their ideological hardening.

The Communist Party of Vietnam focuses unfailing attention on improving the defense capability, and guaranteeing the reliable protection of socialist Vietnam in the face of the intensifying aggressive attacks and undermining actions of imperialism and the Chinese hegemony. Under the supervision of the Communist Party of Vietnam, thanks to the fraternal help of the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism, the extensive use of the experience of the military construction in the USSR, the Vietnamese army has been converted into a modern regular army of a socialist type. It has land forces, Air Force, Navy and anti-aircraft defense. Its weapons include zenith rocket complexes, artillery systems and tanks, modern supersonic jets, combat ships and other military equipment.

The laws adopted in December 1981 by the National Meeting of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam regarding universal military obligation and passing the service by the officer staff are very important for the construction of Vietnamese National Army. According to the new law, the draft age was established from 18 to 27. The period of active service in the army is 3 years for the soldiers of the emergency service, 4 years for technical specialists and personnel of the Navy, and 2 years for individuals who have graduated from VUZ's, and for some representatives of national minorities.

Officers of the Vietnamese National Army are trained in six academies, in the Military Institute of Foreign Languages and 21 military schools. A considerable number of the command staff has been trained in Soviet military educational institutions.

Starting from the tasks advanced by the congress, the personnel of the Vietnamese National Army persistently raises the level of combat skill. Training and maneuvers are held regularly. The experience of combat against the aggressors is studied. It is the basis for the training of troops and headquarters. The communists are in the front of the struggle to improve the combat readiness of the Vietnamese National Army. The leading soldiers of the Vietnamese army enter the ranks of the Communist Party of Vietnam. In the period between the congresses, of the 370,000 people accepted into the party, 59 percent were soldiers.

Vietnam will persistently struggle for a healing of the international situation. It acts as a reliable outpost of socialism and peace in Southeast Asia.

Together with Laos and Kampuchea, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is purposefully and successively achieving a conversion of this region into a zone of peace and stability. The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam has proclaimed the active support of the Program of Peace for the 1980's adopted by the 26th CPSU Congress, the new Soviet suggestions and initiatives aimed at preventing the threat of a new world war, strengthening of detente, safety and international cooperation.

The highest forum of communists of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam will enter the history of the country as a congress which defined new outlooks for the development of the Vietnamese society, provided a deep scientific analysis of the formed situation and indicated specific ways to solve tasks of socialist construction. Mobilization of all forces and resources of the people and the army for the fulfillment of the set tasks is on the agenda of the new stage of revolution.

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ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT, PRODUCE EXPORT GOODS

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Jun 82 p 1

[VNA Release: "The Food Products Industry Sector Improves Management Structure, Increases Source of Export Goods"]

[Text] The food product industry has taken measures to improve its management structure and is vigorously converting to producing export goods.

This year the food products industry sector has met with many difficulties, the supply of raw materials lagging behind plans and demands, the purchase of raw materials being greatly hampered by the shortage of reciprocal goods for sale to farmers, and the supply of import goods being insufficient and late, thus having great impact on production. The sector has provided guidance to related sectors in zoning raw materials areas to serve factories and in setting up and implementing policies on developing industrial crops production to stabilize the source of materials supply for the food processing industry. In the process of zoning raw materials areas, production installations have paid attention to determining the quantity of necessary products, shortening transportation distances, and insuring stable source of raw materials supply for factories. The tea integrated enterprise has rationally zoned raw materials areas to serve tea processing enterprises. Tran Phu, Lai Chau, Viet Lam, and Song Cau tea state farms, which previously delivered tea to Kim Anh (Hanoi) tea processing enterprise, now are delivering tea to the tea processing enterprises which are located in the proximity of raw materials production areas, thus decreasing the volume of goods transportation by 108,610 tons/kilometers in the first quarter, saving 206,000 dong. Sugar cane integrated enterprises, beer integrated enterprise 1, tobacco enterprise 1, and others have gradually stabilized the raw materials areas that serve production. The food products industry sector has also established crude, oil pressing enterprises in areas far from [edible] oil refineries, thus decreasing the volume of transportation and securing residues for the localities to produce sauces and domestic animals' food.

The food products industry sector has switched a number of its consumer goods factories which did not make profit to producing export goods. In the past months, many factories and enterprises have produced rather more export goods than before. The production of shrimp chips for export by the Viet Tri (Vinh Phu) food seasoning factory increased by 119 percent, the value of export goods produced by vegetable oil factories in the South by 162 percent, the production of the Ho Chi Minh City beer factory by 123 percent, that of export tea by

102 percent.¹ Many factories and enterprises have switched to producing other goods or to producing additional, new or secondary products to suit the conditions of raw materials, supplies, and equipment, to achieve higher economic effectiveness. The Viet Tri food seasoning factory, in addition to producing noodles, food seasoning, and shrimp chips, has established a branch plant to produce sauces.² Canning factories, in addition to manufacturing main export goods, have produced beverage, candies, etc. The food industry has provided supplies on a priority basis to the production of main goods such as shrimp chips, liquors, etc., thus achieving high economic effectiveness along with allowing directors general of integrated and incorporated enterprises to be free in dealing with import and export to serve production demands.

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1. ...and that of export sugar by 138 percent.

2. The Tan Binh MSG Factory, Ho Chi Minh City converted to production of export shrimp chips.

AGRICULTURE

PROGRESS REPORT ON GROWING TENTH-MONTH RICE CROP

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Concentrating Manpower on Growing the Tenth-Month Rice -- Northern Provinces Almost Finish Sowing, But Are Slow in Transplanting; Nam Bo Fulfills 91.6 Percent of Plan for Sowing, Transplanting Summer and Autumn Rice; Six Provinces and Municipalities Fulfill and Overfulfill Their Plans"]

[Text] According to the General Department of Statistics, as of 5 July, the northern provinces have sown the tenth-month rice in 115,000 hectares, or 90 percent of the necessary area, with some of them like Thanh Hoa, Hai Hung and Vinh Phu having finished or almost finished the sowing job. The early tenth-month rice seedlings in many localities have suffered from drought: 3,000 hectares in Ha Nam Ninh, 2,500 in Haiphong and 2,172 in Hai Hung.

Because of the drought and harmful insects there will be considerable losses of seedlings. Right now all localities must again check the seedling areas that remain, provide guidance as to transplanting while saving seedlings and do additional sowing, if there is a shortage of seedlings, in order to cover the entire areas put aside for transplanting.

Again as a result of a lack of water, first plowing was done in only 820,000 hectares, or 150,000 hectares less than at this same time last year. The area of plowing and harrowing by machine was small -- according to the data available in 7 provinces, only 45,000 hectares have been plowed (last year's figure was 98,000 hectares). Since soil preparations have been slow, some localities now have seedlings that are ready to be transplanted but have to wait for ricefields. The area in the northern provinces where tenth-month rice seedlings have been transplanted is 215,000 hectares, an increase of over 391,000 hectares as compared with this same time last year.

All localities must fully use all of the available means to bring water into ricefields, to keep up with plowing and harrowing schedules and to use all of the already-mature tenth-month rice seedlings to transplant in all of the area put aside for this crop.

Taking advantage of favorable weather, farmers in the Nam Bo provinces were concentrating their efforts on sowing and transplanting the tenth-month rice. The two provinces that planted a lot of floating rice and did a fast job of sowing and transplanting were An Giang and Dong Thap, which fulfilled nearly 93 and 78 percent, respectively, of their cultivated area goal. Kien Giang in 10 days completed sowing and transplanting in nearly 29,000 hectares.

As of 5 July, the Nam Bo provinces have plowed nearly 948,000 hectares of rice-fields and finished sowing and transplanting of the tenth-month rice in more than 491,000 hectares, or 27.5 percent of the cultivated area goal. Among them, the Mekong River delta provinces finished sowing and transplanting in nearly 460,000 hectares, an increase of 63,600 hectares over this same period last year, thus fulfilling 31 percent of their goal.

Along with growing the tenth-month rice, farmers were giving good care to the summer and autumn rice and continuing to transplant the late summer-autumn rice seedlings. From 25 June to 5 July, they finished sowing and transplanting in 27,000 additional hectares, an increase of 19,000 hectares over the preceding 10-day period, thus raising the total area of summer and autumn rice in Nam Bo to more than 492,000 hectares, or 91.6 percent of its goal. Nine Mekong River delta provinces finished sowing and transplanting in nearly 433,000 hectares, an increase of more than 30,000 hectares over last year. In addition to 4 provinces, Cuu Long, Dong Nai, An Giang and Dong Thap (which overfulfilled their goals by 2.5-27.5 percent) there were 2 units having made good progress: Ho Chi Minh City by overfulfilling its goal by 9 percent and Hau Giang by fulfilling the goal of sowing and transplanting the summer and autumn rice in 80,000 hectares.

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AGRICULTURE

MORE NORTHERN PROVINCES FULFILL GRAIN OBLIGATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 11 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[VNA News Release: "State Granaries in the North Receive 90.06 Percent of Total Amount of Grain To Be Collected in Fifth-Month and Spring Season -- 12 Provinces and Municipalities Fulfill Their Regular Grain Obligation"]

[Text] As of 9 July, two more provinces in the North -- Thai Binh and Vinh Phu -- have fulfilled their regular grain obligation in the 1982 fifth-month and spring season. Thus so far 12 northern provinces and municipalities -- Ha Son Binh, Nghe Tinh, Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh, Haiphong, Binh Tri Thien, Thanh Hoa, Ha Bac, Quang Ninh, Hanoi, Thai Binh and Vinh Phu -- have fulfilled their regular grain obligation. These provinces are stepping up purchases of nonobligation grain.

In the North as a whole, 90.06 percent of the total amount of fifth-month and spring season grain and 92 percent of the regular grain obligation have been collected. The delta and midland provinces have reached 91.3 percent of the total amount of grain to be collected and 104.5 percent of their regular grain obligation; the former Zone 4 provinces, 96.5 and 102 percent. The highland provinces have been slow as they put into state granaries only 30 percent of the total amount of grain to be collected and fulfilled only 37.2 percent of their regular obligation.

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AGRICULTURE

GREATER VOLUME OF SHRIMP, FISH HANDLED IN 1ST SEMESTER

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 12 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Marine Product Sector Raises Shrimp and Fish Catch and Purchases by 3-15.7 Percent"]

[Text] In the first 6 months this year, the marine product sector handled more than 204,300 tons of marine products, an increase of 15.7 percent, and purchased 76,900 tons, an increase of 3.3 percent over the same period last year. By re-organizing production, paying piece wages and bonuses in state enterprises and signing end-product contracts with individual boats and junks, the sector was able to overcome difficulties in regard to materials, fuels and means and to ensure fulfillment of the catch goal. Many provinces either fulfilled or overfulfilled their plans: Minh Hai, Cuu Long, Hau Giang, Ben Tre, Tien Giang, Nghia Binh, Quang Nam-Da Nang, Binh Tri Thien, Thai Binh and Quang Ninh. A few northern coastal provinces succeeded in overcoming the falling off of production. Quang Ninh Province had a catch of 4,700 tons, with the volume of shrimp and squid for export increasing by 1.8 times as compared with the same period last year. Thai Binh Province had a catch of 2,570 tons, an increase of 70.4 percent over the first 6 months of 1981, and purchased 1,310 tons. Binh Tri Thien Province had a catch of 6,316 tons, an increase of 66.4 percent over the same period last year. The central coastal provinces continued to finish the job of signing end-product contracts with individual sea-going boats and junks and with every laborer working on the shore to ensure steady and stable production. Quang Nam-Da Nang Province had a catch of 16,130 tons and purchased 2,900 tons. Nghia Binh Province had a catch of 16,000 tons and purchased 4,200 tons. Phu Khanh Province had a catch of 15,450 tons and purchased 4,900 tons. The Nam Bo provinces that had large volumes of shrimp and fish purchased 15-30 percent of the catches in Ben Tre, Cuu Long and Tien Giang. Minh Hai Province had a catch of 37,400 tons, or 93.5 percent of its annual goal and an increase of 68 percent over the same period last year, and purchased 12,400 tons, 80 percent more than last year.

The volume of shrimp used as an export item reached 85 percent of the annual plan goal. Some provinces that supplied shrimp as raw material for processing

for export were doing quite well: Cuu Long produced 99 tons, or 66 percent of the goal; Tien Giang 121 tons, 150 percent; Long An 149.6 tons, 149.1 percent.

The marine product sector is gathering experience in different geographical areas and stepping up fishing to boost the catch in the last 6 months of this year.

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AGRICULTURE

HA NAM NINH RICE CROP STATISTICS

Hanoi NHAN DAN In Vietnamese 2 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Ha Nam Ninh Province Records an Average Yield of 30 Quintals Per Hectare from the 5th Month-Spring Crop, an Increase of 4.5 Quintals Compared to the Plan and 4.8 Quintals Compared to Last Year's 5th Month-Spring Season; Output Increases by 67,700 Tons"]

[Text] Ha Nam Ninh Province recently had a successful 5th month-spring harvest. This was the largest 5th month-spring bumper crop since that of 1976. Yields averaged 30 quintals per hectare, an increase of 4.5 quintals compared to the plan and 4.8 quintals compared to last year's 5th month-spring season. Paddy output exceeded 430,000 tons, an increase of 67,700 tons compared to last year's 5th month-spring season. With the exception of Binh Luc District, the 5th month-spring rice yields of all districts and Nam Dinh City increased. In 10 districts, rice yields increased by 3 to 7 quintals per hectare compared to last year. Hai Hau District recorded the highest rice yield in the province, 44.4 quintals per hectare. Nearly 50 percent of the cooperatives within the district recorded yields of 50 to 60 quintals per hectare and no cooperative recorded a yield of less than 30 quintals. Behind Hai Hau, four districts had yields that were 5 to 7 quintals per hectare higher than last year's 5th month-spring season: Xuan Thuy: 40.8 quintals; Nam Ninh 34.13 quintals; Nghia Hung: 34.74 quintals; and Duy Tien: more than 32 quintals per hectare. The two cooperatives with the highest yields in the province were Xuan Tien in Xuan Thuy District, 69 quintals, and Hai Bac in Hai Hau District, 65.2 quintals per hectare. In addition, the Hai Van Cooperative in Hai Hau District recorded a yield of 60.5 quintals and the Xuan Kien Cooperative in Xuan Thuy District recorded a yield of 60 quintals per hectare.

As a result of the widespread use of final product contracts with laborers and as a result of building enthusiasm on the part of the masses for their work, the cooperatives made the most efficient use possible of the supplies provided to them. Technological advances were widely applied. Whereas, at one time, only slightly more than 30 percent of the land under cultivation was transplanted with new varieties, during this year's 5th month-spring season, nearly 50 percent of the land under cultivation was transplanted with high yield varieties of rice, such as 424, 5th month number 2, 5th month 33 and 184 and variety VN10. Rice variety

Nong Nghiep 8 accounted for 34 percent of the rice under cultivation. The transplanting schedule was met; 90 percent of fields were transplanted during the best season. The planting density was correct. Cultivation, fertilization and the prevention and control of pests were timely. An average of 7.3 tons of livestock manure was applied per hectare, a 0.8 quintal increase compared to last year's 5th month-spring season; each hectare was also fertilized with 80 kilograms of standard nitrogen fertilizer, which represented a 20 kilogram increase compared to last year. The uniformity among the various areas of the province, among the cooperatives within each district and among cooperative member families was increased.

Having recorded a bumper harvest, the cooperatives have allocated good paddy with which to rapidly fulfill their 5th month-spring grain obligation. The province has seven districts that have completed the depositing of grain in granaries. Hai Hau District has completed 70 percent of its grain mobilization quota for the entire year. Many places have also set aside paddy to sell to the state under economic contracts and at negotiated prices.

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AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR EFFICIENT USE OF WATER PROJECTS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Jun 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Managing and Using Farmland Water Conservancy Projects"]

[Text] Once water conservancy projects have been constructed, the factors of important and decisive significance as regards the efficiency and effectiveness of these projects are the management and use of projects.

Managing and protecting projects well and providing reasonable and scientific irrigation and drainage play a direct role in helping to raise yields, insure that the required amount of area is put under cultivation and economize on electricity, water, money and labor while prolonging the life of projects.

In late 1979, the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions and the Ministry of Water Conservancy launched a movement to emulate the Cau Ghe farmland water conservancy group in Hai Hung, as a result of which the management and use of farmland water conservancy projects have, generally speaking, changed for the better. More and more units that are models of a specific area of operation have emerged in the different areas. During the 2 years 1980 and 1981, many agricultural areas experienced unexpected and severe natural disasters (drought and waterlogging); however, these were also 2 years of bumper crops, an important contribution to which was made by farmland water conservancy work and effective irrigation and drainage. Many farmland water conservancy groups utilized 90 percent or more of the design capacity of their projects, such as the Bac Tuyet farmland water conservancy group in Ha Son Binh Province, the Ninh River Minh Son group in Ha Nam Ninh Province, the Duc Tho group in Nghe Tinh Province, Vu Thu group number 5 in Thai Binh Province, the Hoang Quy and Phong Lac groups in Thanh Hoa Province, the Nguyen Xa Cooperative in Thai Binh Province and so forth. A number of farmland water conservancy corporations utilized more than 80 percent of the design capacity of their systems, such as the Hai Hau Farmland Water Conservancy Corporation in Ha Nam Ninh Province, the Dong Cam Corporation in Phu Khanh Province, the Lien Son Corporation in Vinh Phu Province, the Cau Son Corporation in Ha Bac Province and so forth.

However, besides these model units, there are still more than a few negative phenomena and shortcomings in the management and use of projects that are harming production.

Generally speaking, the various types of projects (primarily the large and medium-scale projects) are still not being used at design capacity. This situation causes many unnecessary difficulties for production. One rather widespread phenomenon is that projects are not well coordinated; there are junctions but not adequate canals or ditches or canals and ditches are in need of repair and obstructed at many places. The blockage of water causes partial drought and waterlogging and results in late planting. Many places waste electricity and water because they do not irrigate or drain their fields in an efficient manner, allowing the water to spill over and leak.

If the negative phenomena mentioned above are corrected and an effort is made in the management and use of projects to increase the percentage of irrigation and drainage capacity utilized to a level close to design capacity and meet the water requirements of crops, farmland water conservancy can make a direct and important contribution to the effort to achieve the goals of raising crop yields, ensuring that the required amount of land is put under cultivation and raising total output.

In view of the fact that the supply of the various types of technical materials for new construction is limited, the management and use of existing projects assume even more important significance in many areas.

Practically all of the fields in the northern provinces have water conservancy projects of various types, projects that serve more than 1 million hectares. Since liberation day, the southern provinces have accelerated the construction of water conservancy projects, primarily medium and small-scale projects, thereby creating the conditions for a winter-spring and a summer-fall rice crop and for putting new, high yield, short-term varieties of rice into production.

The efficient management and use of projects can result in practical economic returns from all types of projects (large, small, modern or manual) on fields that are irrigated by different sources of water, including fields irrigated by rainfall.

The realities of production have shown that if the management and use of projects are put on a regular basis and if the quality of irrigation and drainage is gradually improved, it is clear that water conservancy work can fulfill its function as the foremost measure, thereby creating the conditions for the other technical measures to have an impact and help to raise crop yields, insure that the required amount of area is put under cultivation on schedule, reduce expenses and cut production costs. In actuality, the places that have implemented the various technical measures in a well coordinated manner have raised their yields by at least 1 or 2 quintals of paddy per hectare on areas measuring tens of thousands of hectares.

The experience of the Cau Ghe farmland water conservancy group in its management and use of projects can be flexibly and effectively applied in all areas that have different types of water conservancy projects, from the North to the South. Each

locality, each installation and the responsible sectors must re-examine their farmland water conservancy planning and plans, compare their designs to the results being achieved in fields and point out potentials, weaknesses and shortcomings in order to take the necessary measures. Correctly evaluating the availability of water at each point in time and using water sources in the most profitable manner possible are the highest objectives of project management and use. This requires the implementation of a host of specific, primary measures.

In order for water to flow in an unimpeded manner from junctions to fields, it is necessary to maintain and repair junctions well, dredge and strengthen ditch and canal systems in exact accordance with designs and install an adequate number of sluices to lead water to each field plot. There must be strict adherence to the regulations governing the operation of systems, projects must be opened and closed on schedule and a harsh attitude must be taken concerning those who redirect or impede the flow of water and disrupt irrigation and drainage procedures within the system.

Plans must be adopted for dealing with changes in water sources, either too little or too much water, so that suitable steps can be taken. As regards projects that are used, besides primarily supporting production, for other interests (such as generating electricity, raising fish and so forth), the use of water must be planned in such a way that all interests are satisfied. The northern provinces, which already have projects, place primary emphasis upon the management and use of projects and only build new ones when truly necessary. The southern provinces, which have few projects, must attach importance to management and use in conjunction with new construction.

The important factor of decisive significance in determining the efficiency of management and use is the appointment of persons within the farmland water conservancy management system of the state as well as among the people to manage and operate projects. Managers must first of all possess a full sense of responsibility and the knowledge needed to complete their task.

A farmland water conservancy project is property of the state and the people. The people, who are the ones that use water on a daily basis, must display a high spirit of collective ownership, protect projects and use them in the most economical and profitable manner possible.

Final product contracts with laborers must be widely utilized within the management apparatus of the state and the people.

The responsible sectors, especially those directly responsible, such as the water conservancy, agricultural, power, forestry, fishing and communications-transportation sectors, must give their attention to providing localities and production installations with favorable conditions for improving the management and use of farmland water conservancy projects in keeping with the spirit "the state and the people working together, the central level and the locality working together."

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

MORE SETTLERS--Since the beginning of the year, Binh Tri Thien has sent another 2,734 households of 11,300 persons, including 5,270 laborers, to new economic zones in the central highlands and other provinces. With a view to striking a balance between land and manpower in each production zone, localities in Binh Tri Thien have adopted plans for even distribution of labor force in agriculture, handicrafts and mechanical repairs, etc. The public health, educational and agricultural sectors have also sent 170 management cadres, engineers, doctors, teachers and personnel from the handicraft branch and service trades, to new economic zones. To create favorable conditions for the departees, many agricultural cooperatives in Trieu Hai, Huong Dien, Bo Trach, Ben Hai districts, etc., have actively and promptly paid up their members' wages. They have also used money from the acculation fund to give each laborer a subsidy averaging from 100 to 200 dong. Recently, the Binh Tri Thien people gave departing NEZ settlers more than 2,000 kg of rice, 340,000 dong in cash, and thousands of head of pedigree livestock and plant varieties. [Text] [Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Jul 82 p 1] 9213

CSO: 4209/422

LIGHT INDUSTRY

TEXTILE MILL OVERCOMES SUPPLY SHORTAGE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Jun 82 p 1

[Article: "The Hong Gam Federation of Textile Enterprises Overcomes Its Difficulties and Increases the Output of Cloth"]

[Text] During the first 6 months of this year, the Hong Gam Federation of Textile Enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City only received 10 percent of the raw materials, secondary materials and chemicals to be supplied under the plan for the entire year. Displaying initiative and working with the state to overcome its difficulties, the federation of enterprises found installations that would accept raw materials and produce products under contract and coordinated with a number of export and import corporations in the city and the Mekong Delta to purchase raw materials and sell finished products. As a result of this method of operation, the enterprises within the federation have not only maintained their production, but have also produced more than twice as much cloth than they could have with the raw materials supplied by the state. Textile Enterprise Number 8 has made numerous innovations that have saved cloth and produced new products that are liked by consumers.

The enterprises within the federation are emulating to economize on supplies, raw materials, chemicals and so forth in order to increase the output and improve the quality of cloth.

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CSO: 4209/417

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

CHI LINH-PHA LAI RAILWAY LAYING SPEEDED UP

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ban Vu: "On the Chi Linh-Pha Lai Railway Laying Project"]

[Text] In the midst of an intense heat wave with the temperature approaching 40 degrees Celsius, the entire Pha Lai Thermoelectric Power Station worksite was seething with fresh labor spirit. On the morning of 16 June, the 904 Building Enterprise finished casting its last batch of concrete on a 195-meter-high chimney, the nation's tallest. This achievement has encouraged nearly 20,000 Vietnamese cadres and workers and Soviet specialists to step up building other key projects, with a view to putting Furnace No 1 into commission at the end of the year. At the worksite, where nearly 20 kilometers of rail were being assembled and installed, linking Chi Linh railway station to the Pha Lai electric power station, officials of Railway Corporation No 8 and of Companies 805 and 807, were on hand round the clock to supervise the work strictly, ensuring a fast construction pace, and striving to complete the first phase of assemblage and installation, so that the power station can be put into commission by 5 November 1982. Nearly a year earlier, when work on assembling and installation machinery and equipment was first begun at the Pha Lai thermoelectric power station, Railway Building Companies 805 and 807 of Railway Corporation No 8 had already completed the installation of a 3 km-long railway, including the updating of nearly 1,000 meters on Railways 17 and 51, thus making a noticeable contribution to carrying thousands of tons of supplies into the worksite for Furnace No 1 work cooperation teams.

Then, the workers moved south to Chi Linh, where they joined forces with military units in charge of building the roadbed in carrying out the construction project. Those cadres, who once steadfastly ensured smooth transportation by rail during the anti-U.S. war, and once successfully restored border railways destroyed by Chinese pirates in 1979, are now building the "communist youth's railway to develop the fatherland's electric power." Under a burning summer sun, workers of both sexes tramped the stony roadbed with bare feet, carried rails on their shoulders and hauled crossties in the direction of the Pha Lai power station chimney, struggling to lay each meter of track. This is a wide-track railway measuring 1.435 meters, using precast concrete crossties which weigh 260 kgs apiece, as well as large rails. All technological requirements are in line with international standards.

Notwithstanding difficulties in supplies and equipment, Railway Corporation No 8 has striven to provide a sufficient number of concrete crossties and rails, and assemble and install them later at the Kep railway station before lifting them onto railroad cars for transportation to the project. To ensure progress and alleviate the labor load, Companies 805 and 807 have built in accordance with the semimechanized method, using gantry cranes to hoist stacks of rails of 5 tons apiece and lay them down on the roadbed, and maintaining the rails solidly by hand and by steam hammer. Braving the burning sun of noon and afternoon, the workers were on hand whenever a train carrying materials arrived for unloading. Overcoming all hardships and displaying the concept of mastery, 8 workers using rudimentary shovels would promptly unload a railroad car carrying 38 cubic meters of stone.

Although they work in difficult and rigorous conditions, due to scientific labor organization and to the fact that 90 percent of the work is under contract, many norms involving lifting, filling, laying and unloading have been overfulfilled, and labor safety has been ensured.

So far, the workers have finished laying 3 km of rail on a ferralitic-soil roadbed built by military units across mountains and hills, and ricefields of Hai Hung. Nguyen Loc, acting director of Railway Corporation No 8, said that although at present the corporation is encountering difficulties in stepping up the building pace, due to delayed transportation of materials from Kep, insufficient quantities and inferior quality, the cadres and workers of Railway Corporation No 8 with the determination and the spirit of high responsibility of those who share the honor of producing electricity for the fatherland, will coordinate with other units actively to strive to overcome all obstacles so as to complete the Chi Linh-Pha Lai railway on schedule, so that coal will be delivered in time for Furnace No 1 to go into operation by the end of the year.

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